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Modelling Experiential Knowledge for Research 
 
 
This paper addresses an issue in art and design research. The art and design community is not 
homogeneous, and there are artists who feel that research in art is very different from research in 
design, and deserves to be analysed separately. Likewise, there are designers who feel that design is 
distinctive and warrants a separate treatment. The fundamental issue in this paper is something that is 
common to both, and indeed, is also common to architecture and the performing arts, etc. Finding a 
term that includes these disciplines and satisfies those who occupy them is difficult. The area is 
sometimes referred to as ‘the creative and performing arts’ (UKCGE 2003), but the word ‘arts’ can be 
provocative to designers. Alternatively, ‘creative and cultural industries’1 may be making assumptions 
about how knowledge is applied and valued. This paper tries to find what is common to these areas 
rather than what is different between them. As a result, the paper uses the term ‘art and design’ to 
identify a broad range of creative practices that share, in this case, an interest in the role of experience 
in knowledge generation. 
 
The paper is an ontological enquiry: meaning that it examines the problem of how experience can be 
accommodated in art and design research, not by looking at examples but by looking at what the term 
‘research’ means, and therefore how one might reconceptualise the term ‘experience’ in order to make 
them more compatible. It looks at this problem ‘in principle’ rather than ‘in practice’, which is what 
characterises an ontological enquiry. The conclusion is that the experiential feelings we have merely 
represent something called ‘experiential content’, and it is this content that is relevant to research. The 
paper does not attempt to demonstrate the existence of experiential content in practice. This may be 
dissatisfying to some readers, but it is not the objective of ontological enquiries to identify answers, but 
instead to point the reader in a direction where answers seem most likely to found. 
 
 
Problem Statement 
 
The context for this paper is the vexed question of the role that experience can or should play in 
research in art and design, and in particular whether we can clarify what is meant by ‘experiential 
knowledge’. The reason this is a vexed question is that there seems to be an inherent contradiction 
between the nature of experience and the requirements of research, which arises from the more general 
problem of subjectivity and objectivity. This paper treats the term ‘subjective’ in the philosophical sense 
of ‘pertaining to the perceiving subject’. Experience is essentially subjective because it ‘belongs’ to the 
perceiving subject and cannot be shared by someone else. There are at least two consequences of this 
subjectivity: it leads to variable interpretation of meaning and significance by different perceiving 
subjects; and it leads to difficulties in the communication of content because that content is part of the 
perceiver’s personal and private experience. The inherent contradiction arises because of the converse 
expectation of ‘objectivity’ in research. This paper accepts that there are limits to ‘objectivity’ resulting 
from epistemological scepticism described in an earlier paper (Biggs 2000). As a result the term 
‘objective’ is reframed so that concepts are ‘defensible’ rather than ‘independent’, because the latter 
implies some kind of philosophical Idealism. There are at least two consequences of this objectivity: the 
                                                           
1 A term favoured by Tony Blair’s New Labour Party in UK. 
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need for unambiguous content, thereby describing a specific and bounded parcel of knowledge; and the 
need for unambiguous communication, thereby laying a claim to this parcel by the author. Therefore, 
the consequences of experiential subjectivity appear to contradict the requirements of research 
objectivity. 
 
In response to this vexed question and apparent contradiction, this paper investigates whether there 
can still be a place for experiential knowledge in art and design research, or whether the contradiction is 
actual rather than apparent and is therefore an indication that there is no possible place for such 
knowledge. The method employed to analyse this contradiction is concept analysis in the context of 
philosophical aesthetics. 
 
The term ‘aesthetics’ refers to the analysis of a certain class of experience rather than the theory of 
beauty. ‘Aesthetic response’ refers to a reaction that we have to a meaningful sensory experience. It is 
sometimes felt as a physical response such as having goose-bumps, or being moved to tears by 
emotion. Having such physical symptoms is not a criterion of having an aesthetic response, but serves 
to show that we can and do have a special kind of reaction to certain stimuli associated with pleasure. In 
extreme circumstances, we may manifest physical symptoms, but at a lower level we may simply have 
preferences that are not necessarily backed by conscious judgements. This paper assumes that this 
ability to react to pleasurable stimuli is something commonplace, and not the kind of rare ecstatic 
reaction that has formerly been a focus in aesthetics, known as ‘the sublime’. The ‘aesthetic response’ 
can also be described as a certain category of interpretation, which is familiar to us if we know how to 
view objecs trouvés in the art gallery. We try to have an aesthetic response to such objects, as opposed 
to the everyday response we might normally have to something like a pile of bricks2. We are also having 
an aesthetic response when we express a preference between equally functional designed objects. 
Having claimed that an aesthetic response is commonplace, we can return to the question of whether 
there can be a role for experience in research in art and design, and use the aesthetic response as an 
indicator of the presence of a relevant experience. 
 
 
Contextualising the Problem 
 
Practice-based research is the focus of a great deal of attention in art and design at the moment. In the 
UK, the Arts and Humanities Research Council [AHRC] has commissioned a survey of both practice-
based research and practice-based doctorates in order to obtain an overview of the range of activities 
that are encompassed by the term3. In Sweden, the government has introduced a Bill that extends the 
scope of national research4, and in response the Vetenskapsrådet [Swedish Research Council] has 
established a series of international guest professorships through which to develop practice-based 
research (Sundbaum 2006: 30). In Brazil, there continues to be a divide between research and 
professional practice at the highest level, and academic research. This is evidenced by the impossibility 
of reconciling the two areas in the national research database of Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa 
[CNPq]5. These examples show that the boundary between research and practice is unclear to national 
funding agencies. Even the terminology had yet to be standardised, as recognised by the AHRC in their 
survey briefing. Although ‘practice-based research’ is probably the most widely used expression, it does 
little to clarify what is special about this activity since most research could be said to be based somehow 
in practice, or to have a relationship to the practical world (Langrish 2000: 303). The AHRC currently 
prefers the term ‘practice-led research’ and others have used ‘practice-based’, ‘process-led’, ‘studio-
based’ or ‘studio-led’ research. What all these expressions have in common is a reference to the way in 
which the field of art and design is advanced though the creation of artefacts. This in turn assumes a 
number of different relationships, a few of which will be the focus of this paper. In particular, there is an 
assumption that the knowledge base of art and design in some way includes either the artefacts 
                                                           
2E.g. Carl Andre, Equivalent VIII, 1966. Collection of Tate Modern, London. 
3 AHRC Research Review Practice-Led Research in Art, Design and Architecture. Commissioned Summer 2005. 
4 Bill Research for a Better Life 2005. 
5 CNPq Plataforma Lattes. URL http://lattes.cnpq.br/index.htm 
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themselves or the knowledge that is embodied in them. This assumption is manifest in the cultural 
practice of the display and conservation of these artefacts instead of preserving only secondary 
literature about them. Finally, there is a tendency for theory to be about these artefacts, and to 
constitute critical commentary on them. 
 
 
Artefacts and Theories 
 
The claim in art and design that knowledge is embodied in artefacts is different from the claim of 
scientists and engineers in relation to knowledge demonstrated in their experiments. Although some 
experimental processes result in artefacts such as particle accelerators, nonetheless, research in these 
fields mainly aims to produce principles and theories that are then used to guide the construction of 
artefacts, e.g. bridges. One could say that the artefacts were the practical verification of the validity or 
value of the preceding theoretical outcomes of research. If we compare this with the embodiment claim 
in art and design, we can see that there is a difference in the relationship of theory and experience. 
 
art practice  theory 
science theory  practice 
 
This generalised description illustrates that in art and design the artefact is not normally produced as a 
result of applying a theoretical or critical model. Indeed, the chronology is somewhat the reverse. Arts 
theorisation and criticism follows from an analysis of the artefacts that have already been produced and 
this chronology encourages us to think that the role of artefacts in art and design research may indeed 
be different from the role of artefacts in science and engineering. We can also see that there is a 
political difference between art and design on the one hand, and science and engineering on the other 
because in the latter researchers are in a different category of worker to the former. In art and design, 
we confuse the practitioner who generates the experience with the science researcher who generates 
theory. This contributes to the current problem concerning practice-led research and its relationship to 
studio practice. The mere fact that chronologically the studio practitioner and the science researcher are 
in the same antecedent relationship to art theory does not necessarily imply that all antecedent work in 
the studio is therefore research. When Ryle (1949: 30) said ‘efficient practice precedes the theory of it’ 
he was not making a claim about the status of practice as pre-linguistic research, rather he was making 
an assertion about the relationship of theory as commentary on efficient practice. The differentiation is 
also supported by Keinonen in the present volume, in his separation of the ‘Field of Research (FR)’ from 
the ‘Field of Art (FA)’. 
 
Returning to the issue of the knowledge base of art and design, we need to consider the nature of the 
claim that it is in some way embodied in artefacts. This might be the weak claim that artefacts are 
useful, interesting, aesthetic bearers of meaning, and that this use of artefacts is in some way 
sympathetic to the overall aims of art and design. Alternatively, art and design practice-led researchers 
may be making a stronger claim. Their claim could be that artefacts are an essential part of either the 
process or the communication of its outcomes (cf. Scrivener in this volume: Table 2). It is not difficult to 
identify at least one key feature of art and design artefacts that is indeed related to this claim, and that is 
the ability to evoke an aesthetic response through visual, aural, or gustatory sensation, etc. Thus, we 
are essentially interested in the experience of the artefact and our reception of it. Aesthetic theories 
describe the nature of the aesthetic response as a particular kind of experience, and the reason we 
value it as more than just a particular form of sensory excitement, and why we give it additional social 
and cultural value. Because the aesthetic response is intimately linked to the artefact itself, it is clear 
that we must have artefacts and not just theories about artefacts in order to stimulate the aesthetic 
response. Here we can also see a familiar pattern, that aesthetic experience precedes aesthetic 
theorisation. The normal model is therefore experience first, and theorisation and knowledge second. 
This accords with the earlier observation that the practice of artefact production in the studio is usually 
not predicated on an explicit theory. 
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Let us stay for the moment with the insight that an aesthetic response is stimulated by an experience, 
and that experience is made available to us because of the existence of the artefact that has been 
made by the artist or designer. If we consider the illusive notion of ‘intention’, we might venture to 
suggest that the artist or designer intended us to have a certain experience and, as it were, embodied 
that intention in the artefact (Diaz-Kommonen 2004). This is, I believe, the nature of the argument given 
by practitioners to defend their role as researchers. The artist or designer embodies an idea in an 
artefact through their personal skill. This embodied idea then becomes the object of experiential 
reception and critical analysis. Because critical analysis and experiential reception both generate forms 
of new knowledge then, the claim goes, that was the intention of the artist/designer, who should have 
the credit as the researcher. This claim would seem to have some legitimacy if considered as a type of 
collaborative research, in which some of the work is done by the artist/designer and some is perhaps 
done by the critic. 
 
We have observed that one of the functions of the critic is to extract theoretical notions from the analysis 
of artefacts. In addition, we can observe that there is also a modal transformation from the visual or 
sensual reception of objects into language. This is noteworthy because aspects of non-linguistic 
artefacts are represented in language by the critic, and that in terms of form if not in terms of content, 
this is the moment at which the claimed outcomes of art and design research achieve a presentation 
that is similar to the outcomes of research in other fields. 
 
Earlier in this paper, it was suggested that we might use the expression ‘intention’. Apart from the 
dangers of the so-called ‘intentional fallacy’ (Wimsatt 1954: IV), it is probably not the claim of all 
artists/designers that they have an explicit intention that they wish to communicate, but instead to put 
before the viewer a number of experiences and to admit, indeed encourage, a pluralistic approach to 
the significances of those experiences (cf. reference to Blanchot in Laakso’s paper in the present 
volume). Such interpretations are situated and benefit from pluralism rather than being weakened by it. 
The reason why we may be tempted by the notion of artistic intention is that we have already noted that 
research includes at least two objective expectations that seem to require directed approaches. The first 
is that something new has been gained: not just a novel artefact that has not existed before, but new 
knowledge that has not existed before. In order to give credit to the artist for the production of this new 
knowledge, we must attribute to the artist an awareness of what they have achieved, and the claim that 
they had purposively embodied this knowledge in the artefact. Secondly, we also need to attribute 
intention [in the sense of purposiveness] to the artist, not just of manifesting the knowledge through this 
embodiment, but also of having the express intention of communicating it to others. Thus, we could say 
that the first intention legitimises the intellectual property as being, at least in part, owned by the artist. 
Secondly, we could say that the knowledge is disseminated by the artist, as is required if this new 
knowledge is to contribute to the field and not just to the personal development of the artist. 
 
We have now identified the two core claims of practice-led research. The first of these is that the 
artefact is essential because it has the potential not just to evoke experiences in the viewer but also to 
evoke particular experiences that have been embodied in it by the artist researcher. Second, that 
through this process of embodiment, the artefact becomes the vehicle of communication, and repeated 
exposure to persons will have the effect of disseminating the experiential content that has something to 
do with the research value of the artefact. Practice-based researchers may be claiming one or both 
aspects. 
 
Unfortunately, it is still unclear the extent to which embodiment in an artefact is part of communicating 
experiences and the extent to which it is part of a research process prior to its communication. In other 
words, is the artefact the equivalent of a report that neatly summarises experimental and speculative 
work that has gone on elsewhere, or is the artefact more like an experiment: raw process or raw data 
that may or may not be summarised linguistically elsewhere, for example, by a critic? The stronger 
claim is that the artefact is the equivalent of a report. This is a strong claim because it implies that an 
alternative form of summary would not be possible, i.e. that art and design research produces 
something non-linguistic, and this is why the outcome must be an artefact and not a piece of writing by a 
critic. As we have seen, this is intimately bound up with the notion that the aesthetic response is 
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important in the field of art and design. This stronger claim also subsumes the weaker one because 
there would be no reason to have a non-linguistic communication at the end of a linguistic process. It is 
therefore coherent for the non-linguistic claims of art and design research that the need for an artefact-
based communication of the outcomes of art and design research arises from the non-linguistic nature 
of the process as a whole. This would also be true for other forms of expression, such as music, 
architecture, etc. 
 
At this point, it might be useful to clarify the meaning of newness and originality in art and design 
research, because the value that is embodied in the outcome lies not in its non-linguistic mode but in its 
original contribution to what is known or understood in the field. It would be easy, and indeed trivial, to 
create experiences that are new in the sense that they have never been experienced before. Every 
creative production is new: even the drawings of 5-year-old children have never been seen before in 
exactly this arrangement. This has caused some confusion in the past since all production from the 
studio is by this token new and apparently making a new contribution to the world. But that which is new 
in such cases is an experience, whereas what is required in research is new knowledge. Whether the 
new experience can be connected to new knowledge is something that is being discussed in this paper. 
What can already be stated is that the mere newness of the experience is not necessarily an indicator 
that it is connected to new knowledge. 
 
There is something else that we can observe about the nature of the embodied experiential content. 
Since every creative production entails newness, what the art and design researcher needs to claim for 
experience is less about newness and more about instrumentality (Biggs 2002). Thus, there is an 
implicit claim: that we need to attend to the artefact because the experience of it is instrumental in the 
building or creation of the new knowledge that is its claimed value. Such a claim would begin to explain 
the role of the artefact and our experience of it, in the communication of content. 
 
The instrumentality, the claim of a causal link between the experience and the subsequent knowledge, 
at first sight seems to be a difficult connection to establish. To illustrate the possibility of such a 
connection: we generally accept the social and cultural phenomenon of aesthetic reception in which an 
artefact, including intangibles such as music, creates a particular kind of reaction in the perceiving 
subject, over and above the apperception of the mere sense data or however else one might wish to 
model the basic sensory mechanism. The aesthetic response requires something more: a kind of 
resonance between the perceptual and the cognitive faculties that causes us to categorise certain 
objects as affective and to give them social and cultural value. Although it is true that these values 
change, the general principle that certain objects are capable of causing this resonant affect is one that 
is generally accepted (e.g. Scruton 1983). This reinforces the earlier observation that this paper bases 
its account of the relationship of studio production to research in the tradition of philosophical aesthetics, 
that is to say, not just the aesthetic response per se, but the significance of the aesthetic response to 
the social construct of meaning, significance and communication. 
 
Experience 
 
An aspect that has thus far passed by without comment is the relationship between experience and 
experiential content. These two are not synonymous. The word ‘experience’ focuses on the sensation 
and feelings we get when exposed to certain objects and situations, whereas experiential content is that 
which can be extracted from the moment and therefore has the possibility to form the basis for 
something else, such as knowledge. Finding some common ground in what are inevitably subjective 
[sic] judgements has long been a goal in aesthetics, for example Kant’s differentiation between 
individual preferences and common judgements of taste (Kant 1980: §VII). Nonetheless, it is not clear 
whether such a separation is possible in contemporary practice and therefore whether there can be 
such a thing as experiential content. Perhaps as soon as we remove ourselves from sensation, or 
analyse it, then its essence escapes and experiential content becomes simply some abstracted 
reflection on what has happened. This would be a significant objection, and it is broadly the objection of 
Phenomenology. Phenomenology strives to maintain a direct relationship, a pre-cognitive relationship, 
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with experience but accepts, for example in Sartre, that one will inevitably be in ‘bad faith’ with one’s 
own feelings and actions because at the very moment of their reception such feelings are subject to a 
local historicism in which they are instantaneously recruited into one’s personal self-perception and 
world-view (Sartre 1969: 47ff.). It is an interesting symptom of the complexity of maintaining an 
authentic relationship with phenomena that the language used to describe it seems so indirect and 
complex. One might explain this as a symptom not of the complexity of the relationship, but of the 
complexity of describing sensory experience in linguistic form. However, the fact that chronologically the 
account comes after the experience is also an indicator that one is already in the historicising moment 
and the complexity of the language is a symptom of one recognising the inauthenticity of our 
relationship to what one is trying to describe. 
 
The purpose of this discussion of Phenomenology is to consider the difference between experience and 
experiential content. What Phenomenology demonstrates is that maintaining a direct relationship with 
experience is difficult. This paper suggests that it is not only difficult, but in the present context, 
pointless, since it is what we do with its significance that matters. Although experience is something we 
value because it is so intimately related to the characteristic nature of the outcomes of art and design, in 
art and design research we need to step beyond that into the knowledge base of the subject. To do this, 
there needs to be a bridge, and the bridge that has been suggested, problematised, but perhaps as yet 
not substantiated, is the concept of experiential content. 
 
Although experiences may be regarded as one element that particularly characterises the reception of 
art and design, they bring with them an important limitation as far as research is concerned and that is 
their subjectivity. Experiences are necessarily first-person: it is I who has the experience and nobody 
else can have the experience for me. As a result, I must build my own bank of experiences and I can 
learn only indirectly from what others tell me of theirs. This concept can be unpacked a little more. It is 
quite common for us to speak of experiences: when we come back from holiday we tell our friends of 
the experiences that we have had. But these are descriptions of what we have done, and perhaps 
descriptions of feelings that we have had. We do not anticipate or intend that those we tell will have 
surrogate experiences of exactly the kind that we have had. Our descriptions may cause our listeners to 
have feelings and experiences but they will be different from the experiences they would have had if 
they were directly exposed to the original stimuli as we were. Furthermore, even if they were exposed to 
the same stimuli at the same time, they would not necessarily have the same experience because of it 
being personal and subjective. That is what is wrong with the expression “if I were you I would have 
done…”. If “I were you” I would have done exactly what you did, it is only if “I were me” that I would have 
done something different: but in that case the situation tells us very little. Language can be misleading 
because although we use expressions such as ‘let me tell you about my experiences’, there is no 
implication that the experience is communicated but rather ‘let me tell you what happened to me’ or 
‘what I saw’, etc. 
 
This clarifies the two difficulties above regarding the inclusion of experiences in research. These 
difficulties need to be taken into account in the description of what constitutes art and design research. 
The first difficulty is that as I build my bank of experiences everything that is new is new-for-me. Whilst 
having experiences that are new-for-me is important for me and my personal development, it has been 
shown that this is not the kind of newness and originality that is significant for research. In research, one 
is concerned with new knowledge that has hitherto been unknown to anybody. Because I must have 
these experiences myself and be directly exposed to the stimuli that cause them, I am locked into a very 
direct one-to-one first-person relationship with ‘objects of acquaintance’ (Russell 1912: Chap.5). The 
reason why I am forced into this kind of relationship is part of the second difficulty: that experiences per 
se cannot be communicated to others. In telling of my experiences I do not evoke the same experiences 
in others. Indeed a third difficulty is that I have no way of knowing whether, if others were exposed to 
the same stimuli, they would have the same experience. Thus experiences are necessarily private 
(Wittgenstein 1968: 299) and subjective in the philosophical sense of belonging to the perceiving 
subject and affected by their agency. 
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These difficulties are all counter-indicators to the possibility that experiences per se could be an integral 
part of art and design research, because of the requirement that the outcomes of research must be 
communicable and disseminated. Even if one accepts a certain plurality in the way in which individuals 
receive and make use of experiences, still the research context requires a purposiveness and directed 
quality to the transmission of knowledge from the researcher to the audience. It is this requirement that 
focuses our attention on the content of the experience rather than the experience itself. In other words, 
what content have we gained as a result of an experience once the immediate feelings and sensations 
have passed? 
 
In an earlier paper (Biggs 2004: 9), it was proposed that it might be useful to consider the relationship 
between experiential content and experience or experiential feeling as being a representational 
relationship. The purpose of an alternative representation is either to overcome some difficulty in the 
perception of certain qualities in the original, or to facilitate its communication. The alternative form is 
therefore chosen because it does not suffer from the difficulties of the original. There must be some 
difference between the representation and the original, or we cannot say that one represents the other. 
For example, an object cannot represent itself, it simply is itself. The word ‘representation’ would be 
inappropriate in such circumstances6. Therefore, in evoking representation, this paper asserts that 
experiential content is distinct from experience or experiential feeling. 
 
We have seen that the form of experiential feeling presents certain difficulties for research because of 
its inherent subjectivity and problems of communication. Therefore changing the form of experience 
might overcome some of these difficulties. Using this approach, we might anticipate that experiential 
content is not especially like experience, but in some way analogous to it. In an analogy, certain 
qualities of one thing are compared with certain qualities of another, but in other respects the two things 
compared are quite different. As a result, we could hypothesise that experiential content might not be 
especially like experiential feeling in the way in which we experience it, so much as the way in which we 
understand it. As a result of this transformation, experiential content need no longer have the 
undesirable qualities of experience and therefore need not bring with it notions of epistemic subjectivity. 
Nor need experiential content be a strange hybrid of experience and cognition. 
 
Proposal 
 
This paper therefore proposes that experiential feelings should be regarded as representations of 
experiential content. There are several reasons for suggesting this. Experiential feelings are very 
powerful and are characteristic of, and often essential to, the reception of artefacts in art and design. 
But these feelings are subjective: they are trapped within the perceiving subject, and we cannot be sure 
that all people experience these artefacts in the same way. This makes communication and 
dissemination difficult. If these qualities were regarded as representations of something else more 
fundamental, then these difficulties might be overcome. Two questions remain if we take this path. 
Firstly, what kind of form would this content have, and secondly, how desirable is it that we maintain and 
communicate these experiential qualities? 
 
It is difficult to imagine a represented content that in some way refers to the qualities of experiential 
feeling that interest us, without it continuing to suffer from the same problems of subjectivity and 
communication that we have already encountered. However, this problem can be avoided because 
these qualities, although they are characteristic, are not the core qualities that concern us and therefore 
we are not obliged to seek a form that has these qualities. This paper proposes that the presence of the 
problems of subjectivity and communication are merely indicators of the presence of a certain kind of 
artefact: an aesthetic artefact. These qualities cue us to interpret the artefact in a particular way: as an 
                                                           
6 Naturally, a lot more could be said about these statements, e.g. linguistic semantics is based on this distinction. 
Even the mimetic theory of representation relies on at least a small difference between the representation and the 
representamen in order to identify the process of mimesis. The constructionist theory of representation 
concentrates on this difference. The representational theory of cognition suggests that this difference is 
inescapable. 
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object of art and design. Having cued the adoption of an appropriate mode of interpretation, we can 
dispense with the notion of experiential feeling and concentrate on the more significant and transferable 
aspect of experiential content. Therefore, although the representation may be characterised by 
experiential feeling, what it represents need not have these characteristics. 
 
The fact that we do attempt to describe our experiences to others perhaps suggests another way of 
conceptualising experiential content. When we speak about experiences, we know that we cannot 
evoke the same experience in others as we had ourselves. We rely on two things in the listener. The 
first is that the listener may recognise in what we say some equivalent experience that they have had 
themselves. Both parties know that the degree of agreement in the nature of this experience is likely to 
be unpredictable but where there is a willingness, a ‘suspension of disbelief’, to be tolerant of the 
degree of agreement or disagreement, then communication can occur. We describe such listeners as 
‘sympathetic’. The second way that communication can occur is if we have a listener who is ‘empathic’. 
The empathic listener need not have experienced what we describe, but is prepared and able to ‘put 
themselves in our shoes’ and creatively imagine what it might have been like in that situation and what 
feelings that situation might have evoked. The most empathic listeners go further and appear to 
understand what it would have been like for the speaker in that situation rather than themselves. The 
concepts of sympathy and empathy show that there are surrogate ways of having experiences that are 
linguistically and socially institutionalised and point towards a notion of experiential content. In this 
context of sharing it is clear that the experiences themselves cannot be shared. The experiences 
stimulate a description and the sympathetic or empathic listener uses this description to anticipate 
something about that experience and recreates a surrogate experience for themselves, knowing that 
this is not the same as that which would be caused by direct acquaintance with the stimulus. In this 
description, something has bridged the gap between the speaker and the listener and this bridge is 
once again the concept of experiential content. 
 
Other examples can be given in which we are more concerned with content than with the accompanying 
feeling, even though it is a feeling that cues our response. Figure 1 is an example of simultaneous 
brightness contrast from colour theory (Itten 1964). 
  
 
                                       
 
Figure 1: Simultaneous Brightness Contrast 
 
It is clear that one must engage with the phenomenological experience of seeing these colours and not 
just reading about them. Someone who has been blind from birth could not have direct knowledge of 
this phenomenon: it would not be an ‘object of acquaintance’ in Russell’s terms. But there are many 
things about which we do not have knowledge, even regarding objects with which we are acquainted. It 
was my experience during colour theory classes at art school, that many students did not seem to be 
experiencing the phenomena that were being described. I had that experience myself, that I did not 
always ‘see’ what I was supposed to see. 
 
Gregory and Heard (1979 §1.1), as a second example, claim that subjects will consistently experience 
the horizontal lines in the Münsterberg Figure as crooked. This is also a phenomenon with which we 
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must have direct acquaintance in order to have the associated experience; of a conflict between our 
conceptual and perceptual knowledge. 
 
 
Figure 2: Münsterberg Figure 
 
As a final example, experiments were conducted by Fechner in the 19th century in which subjects were 
asked to express a preference for the proportions of rectangles, and those experiments seemed to 
reinforce the claim that the Golden Section is perceived as a particularly harmonious and preferred ratio 
(Frings 2002: 19). All three of these examples: simultaneous brightness contrast, visual illusion, and 
harmonious proportions; although based on perceptual experience, can be summarised linguistically. In 
all cases it is necessary to have a perceptual experience, but the outcome is a rule from which one 
could construct examples that demonstrate the phenomenon in question. Even the example from colour 
theory could be specified in terms of the wavelengths of the light involved, etc. This shows three things: 
that there is a content that is separable from the experience; that it can be summarised and 
communicated linguistically; and that the conditions for these experiences are replicable. As a result, 
this paper claims that it should be the purpose of art and design research to disembody the content from 
the experience and thereby render transferable what was formerly subjective and non-transferable. Art 
and design research should use the experiential feeling aroused in the viewer as an indicator of the 
presence of experiential content that might otherwise be hidden in the plethora of objects in the world. 
Making this separation makes the conditions of the experience, rather than the subjective experiential 
feeling itself, replicable and hence comparable to one of the important criteria of research in the 
sciences 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We now have a model of how to address experience in art and design research, and extract from it 
experiential knowledge. Not all research in this field needs to have this as a central issue, but when it 
does, this paper suggests a solution as to how it may be addressed. The model frames the problem as 
a representational one in which content is initially indicated by the presence of certain experiences and 
feelings, and it is the task of the researcher to make explicit the content of which these experiences and 
feelings are a representation. The underlying problem will always be of the type: ‘of what is this a 
representation?’ As a consequence, one might ask whether experiential content could itself be an 
artefact that evokes feelings. It would be attractive to artists for the answer to this question to be ‘yes’ 
because that would mean it was possible to have a research outcome consisting solely of visual 
artefacts without any additional texts, i.e. to have experiential feelings as representations of experiential 
feelings as content. However, this paper now proposes an answer, and, to the disappointment of the 
artist, it is ‘no’. The reason why the outcome of the research cannot be constituted by an artefact that 
evokes particular experiences is because all experiences are subjective and non-transferable, and 
therefore can only be indicators of the presence of something needing to be unpacked. This paper does 
not propose that the implication of unpacking is that one must be able to specify the content 
linguistically, and communicate it linguistically. However, it is making the requirement that to be an 
outcome rather than part of the process of research one must face the issue of subjectivity and 
communication. Therefore, the outcome cannot itself be intrinsically subjective and non-transferable, 
and if there is an aspect of experiential feeling to the representation then it must not be essential to the 
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appropriate interpretation of the representation. This is comparable to the questions of psychological 
research into perception, which do not simply demonstrate phenomena, but attempt to explain why 
these phenomena occur (cf. Gregory & Heard 1979). In psychological research, the experience is a 
means to an end, and that is how it needs to be in art and design research, too. Experiential feelings per 
se cannot be the outcome of research, and even though experiential feelings are important in the 
reception of art and design, they are merely an accompaniment to content. 
 
This modelling of the role of experiential feeling in research in art and design should still be attractive to 
researchers because it leaves open the possibility that part of the research process might legitimately 
be involved with experiential feeling. What is now perhaps less attractive is that experiential content is 
only indicated by, and not explicitly communicated through, embodiment in artefacts. Experiential 
content must, therefore, be extracted and alternatively represented. Making art and design research into 
a representational problem does not diminish the importance of this experiential component. According 
to this paper, content is initially indicated by the very experiential and aesthetic aspects that most 
characterise the field. That is a important role for experience. Following this initial identification, the 
transformational process of unpacking the representation is also both creative and revelatory. It allows 
us to see aspects and to make connections that were hitherto invisible and unknown. We might 
compare this to the sciences that also seek to find new insights and to make new connections in the 
existing material world, not just to add new artefacts to it. In a similar way, this paper has concentrated 
not on the newness of the artefacts that are the products of studio practice in art and design, but the 
insights and connections that arise from them as a result of art and design research, and the way that 
can contribute knowledge. 
 
Finally, conceptualising the act of research in art and design in this way substantially reduces the 
apparent differences between the sciences and the arts. We have seen that both aspire to make 
‘objective’, transferable and communicable judgements about the material world. The collection of 
judgements that are accepted by the respective communities as meaningful and upon which further 
work may be based forms the knowledge-base of the field (Biggs 2005). The knowledge-base is what 
the contemporary practitioner needs to know in order to function effectively and to address the current 
issues and questions in ways that are relevant and meaningful to others, and through so doing is able to 
add to that knowledge base. 
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